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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
SPRINGER V. ERIE INS. EXCH.: AN INSURER MAY NOT
INVOKE A BUSINESS PURSUIT EXCLUSION TO ABANDON
ITS DUTY TO DEFEND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
CONTINUITY AND PROFIT MOTIVE OF ITS INSURED’S
BUSINESS.
By: Lauren Ellison
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that for a third party complaint to
trigger a “business pursuits” exclusion, the insurer must consider the
insured’s business continuity and profit motive. Springer v. Erie Ins. Exch.,
439 Md. 142, 146, 94 A.3d 75, 78 (2014). The court further held that the
allegations made in the third party’s complaint were insufficient to trigger
the “business pursuits” exclusion. Id.
In 2011, J.G. Wentworth initiated suit against David Springer
(“Springer”) and Sovereign Funding Group (“Sovereign”) for defamation
and false light. Springer and Sovereign allegedly operated publicly
accessible websites containing false and misleading information in an effort
to target competitor J.G. Wentworth’s potential and existing customers.
Springer and Sovereign directed potential customers to visit those particular
websites while openly denying any connection to the sites.
In response to the suit filed by J.G. Wentworth, Springer contacted his
insurer, Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”). Springer requested that Erie
provide him with legal representation and claimed that they were required to
do so under the terms of his home insurance policy. Springer’s policy
included a provision for personal injury; however, Erie denied Springer’s
request, citing the policy’s “business pursuits” exclusion clause. This clause
negated the insurer’s liability to defend its policyholder if the policyholder is
accused of a “personal injury arising out of business pursuits . . . .” With his
request denied, Springer retained counsel to defend the cause of action
initiated by J.G. Wentworth, which was subsequently dismissed with
prejudice.
Springer attempted to recover the cost of his legal representation from
Erie. Erie refused, and Springer brought suit seeking declaratory relief and
damages for breach of contract; Erie also counterclaimed seeking declaratory
relief. Both Erie and Springer filed motions for summary judgment. The
Circuit Court for Frederick County granted summary judgment in favor of
Erie and entered a declaratory judgment in favor of Erie. The court held that
the J.G. Wentworth complaint was sufficient to trigger the “business
pursuits” exclusion, and therefore, Erie had no duty to defend. Springer
subsequently filed a timely appeal. However, before the court of special
appeals could render a decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland issued a
writ of certiorari sua sponte.
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The court began its analysis by addressing how it interprets ambiguous
terms in an insurance policy. Springer, 439 Md. at 158, 94 A.3d at 84-85.
When faced with ambiguous terms, the court focuses on the policy’s
“customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning.” Id. at 158, 94 A.3d at 85
(citing MAMSI Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Callaway, 375 Md. 261, 279, 825
A.2d 995, 1005 (2003)). In the instant case both “business pursuits” and
“arising out of” were undefined within the policy and the parties disputed
their meanings; therefore, the court looked elsewhere for guidance.
Springer, 439 Md. at 159-61, 94 A.3d at 85-86.
Relying on precedent, the court concluded that the phrase “arising out of”
is interpreted broadly and does not require the harmful act to be the sole
cause of the injury. Springer, 439 Md. at 159, 94 A.3d at 85 (citing N.
Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230, 533 A.2d 682,
689 (1987)). Specifically, the court concluded “arising out of” to mean
“originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like.” Springer, 439
Md. at 159, 94 A.3d at 85 (citing N. Assurance Co. of Am., 311 Md. at 230,
533 A.2d at 688)).
The court recognized that the inquiry did not end there, and proceeded to
synthesize the meaning of a “business pursuit.” Springer, 439 Md. at 160, 94
A.3d at 86. Although “business” was defined in the policy, the term
“business pursuit” was not. The court stated the implicit purpose of such
business exclusions is to remove from a homeowner’s policy the type of
coverage that should be covered under a separate business insurance policy.
Id. at 160-61, 94 A.3d at 86 (citing Erickson v. Christie, 622 N.W.2d 138,
140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). Because theCourt of Appeals of Maryland had
never had the opportunity to examine a business pursuit exclusion, it looked
to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland for guidance.
Previously, the court of special appeals held that when an insured is
engaged in a professional pursuit requiring his or her time and energy, and
receives compensation, the act is a “business pursuit.” Springer, 439 Md. at
162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing McCloskey v. Republic Ins. Co., 80 Md. App. 19,
22-25, 559 A.2d 385, 386-88 (1989)). Although “business pursuit” has been
defined by the intermediate court, it did not identify specific variables for an
insurer to consider. Springer, 439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland opted to rely on commentators and
sister courts in adopting a functional two-pronged test. This test stated that
to constitute a “business pursuit,” an action must have both continuity and
profit motive. Springer, 439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing J.A.
APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW §
53.06(2)(d)(i)(lib. ed.)). Continuity is measured by determining whether
there is continuous activity for the purpose of earning a livelihood. Springer,
439 Md. at 162, 94 A.3d at 87 (citing APPLEMAN,supra). Profit motive is
measured by demonstrating that the business activity was undertaken as an
attempt at financial gain. Id. (citing APPLEMAN, supra). The court concluded
that continuity and profit motive must be considered when interpreting a
“business pursuit exclusion.” Id. at 164, 94 A.3d at 89 (emphasis added).
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After adopting the two-pronged test, the court addressed its “duty to
defend” jurisprudence as a related issue regarding third party complaints.
Springer, 439 Md. at 164, 94 A.3d at 88. The court has limited the insurer’s
ability to refuse defense of an insured solely on the basis of a third party
complaint. Id. When establishing a duty to defend, a court must answer two
questions: (1)what type of coverage is in question and what defenses are
available under the terms of the specific policy, and (2) if the allegations in
the suit could potentially bring the claim within the policy’s coverage. Id. at
167, 94 A.3d at 90 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292
Md. 187, 193, 438 A.2d 282, 285 (1981)). The court further asserts that the
duty to defend should be construed liberally in favor of the insured.
Springer, 439 Md. 167, 94 A.3d 90 (citing Litz v. State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co., 346 Md. 217, 231, 695 A.2d 566, 572 (1997)).
Having determined the two-prong analysis for the “business pursuits”
exclusion and an insurer’s duty to defend, the court applied these principles
to the case at hand. The court ultimately held that the allegations in the
complaint were facially insufficient to invoke the “business pursuits”
exclusion, and were insufficient to uphold the lower court’s rulings for
declaratory relief and summary judgment in favor of Erie, the third party.
Springer, 439 Md. at 167-68, 94 A.3d at 90-91. The court’s indecision as to
whether Springer was the CEO of Sovereign and if Sovereign was actually a
registered business entity at the time the suit was filed created enough
uncertainty that required the court to further explore the extent of the alleged
“business pursuit.” Id. The court also noted that without any information
regarding profit motive, the “business pursuits” exclusion could not be
triggered. Id. at 168. The court vacated the ruling, and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. In Springer, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
an insurer cannot invoke the “business pursuits” exclusion without first
considering the insured’s business continuity and profit motive. Springer has
established a threshold that insurance companies must meet prior to denying
a policyholder legal representation under an exclusion within the policy. The
court’s decision minimizes the insurer’s discretion in denying legal
representation on the forefront of a third party lawsuit against an insured.
Even if there is only a slight possibility that the complaint consists of an
activity protected under the policy’s coverage, the insurance company will be
required to legally represent the insured. Insurance providers should be
aware of the exclusion language in their policies and be prepared to carefully
draft new policy exclusions to avoid ambiguity.

